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Regulation of Nitrogen Pollution: Taxes versus Quotas
E. Kwan Choi and Eli Feinerman
This paper investigates the effects of first-best policies to regulate nitrogen application.  Some
nitrogen fertilizer is applied ex ante before a random rainfall, but sidedressed nitrogen may
be  applied ex  post.  First-best  policy  is  a  tax  or a  quota on  ex  ante  application,  because
sidedressed nitrogen  is not  leached.  Since a risk-averse farmer uses more  nitrogen ex ante
than  a risk-neutral  farmer,  a higher tax  must be imposed on  the former.  Action equivalent
first-best taxes and quotas are also welfare equivalent. An empirical model for wheat in Israel
was used to demonstrate the analytical findings.
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Introduction
Recent years  have witnessed  a growing  concern about the environmental  cost of nitrogen
fertilizer,  which escapes  to  surface and groundwater  supplies and is  a potential  source of
ozone  layer  destruction  (Swanson;  National  Research  Council).  Since  the  1950s,  total
nitrogen fertilizer use in the U.S. has increased approximately 400%. Similarly, nitrogen use
in Israel during the last two decades more than doubled.
Nitrogen  is used as an essential plant nutrient, but only about 50-70%  is actually taken
up by crops and the remainder is mineralized,  incorporated in the soil's organic matter, and
lost by denitrification  and  volatilization  and by leaching (Keeney).  While pesticides  and
herbicides are  regulated,  at present,  nitrogen  is not regulated  in many regions of the U.S.
and Israel.  In the absence of direct government regulation,  farmers have no  incentives to
take into account the negative environmental  externalities arising from nitrogen use.  Input
decisions  of farmers  are  based solely  on private interests  and the potential  social costs  or
health  risks are  completely  ignored.  In this  situation,  nitrogen applications  are  excessive
when compared to the situation where the external costs are  internalized into the decision-
maker's  objective  function.  Excessive  production  of commodities  which  use  nitrogen
intensively has adverse  consequences on the surface and groundwater.'
Although the literature has extensively analyzed the fertilizer decisions under uncertainty
(e.g., Ryan  and Perrin),  impacts of fertilizer regulation  have received  scant attention.  The
impact of risk-aversion on the ex ante level of fertilizer application is not obvious a priori.
Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker argued that in the absence of leaching, risk-averse farmers
use  less nitrogen than risk-neutral  farmers  and suggested that a  subsidy (negative  tax) be
used to encourage risk-averse farmers to use more nitrogen (p.  182). Others have argued that
risk-averse farmers use more nitrogen than risk-neutral ones (e.g., Ryan and Perrin). In these
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Water polluted with nitrogen  possesses health  risks.  Specifically,  nitrites (NO2) in drinking water oxidizes  the hemoglobin
in  the  blood  and  forns methemoglobin  which  is  lethal  in  small doses  for  embryos  and  babies  (Lee).  Second,  production
uncertainty causes risk-averse  farmers to use nitrogen as insurance against potential  yield losses.Taxes versus Quotas  123
studies, producers are assumed to make production decisions ex ante, before uncertainty is
resolved.
In  light of increased nitrogen  use and its adverse environmental  consequences,  there is
a need to develop an analytical model to investigate the impacts of policies to regulate farm-
level nitrogen use,  taking farmers' attitudes toward  risk into account.  This paper borrows
the conceptual  framework ofYohe (1976;  1978) and Weitzman comparing taxes and quotas
under uncertainty  and investigates  the effects of taxes and quotas on  nitrogen application
for risk-neutral  and risk-averse  farmers.  We  assume that some nitrogen is  applied ex ante
before  a random event (rainfall)  is observed,  and  sidedressed  nitrogen may be applied ex
post. Thus,  risk-averse  farmers  retain flexibility to adjust inputs after the random event  is
observed. While split nitrogen application decision has been investigated (Feinerman, Choi,
and  Johnson),  the  impacts of regulation  on nitrogen  use in agriculture  have not received
much attention.
With the  advanced  irrigation technologies  (e.g.,  drip irrigation),  most of the  irrigated
water is taken up by plant roots,  and hence, leaching of nitrogen applied via the irrigation
system is negligible. However, random rainfall can increase soil moisture over field capacity
and  cause  leaching  of nitrogen  below  the  root  zone  to  the  groundwater  aquifer.  Since
sidedressed  nitrogen is  applied  after the rainy season,  we assume  that it is  not  subject to
leaching. Thus, the first-best policy is to control ex ante nitrogen application only.
Yield and Nitrogen Leaching
Consider a representative  farmer who  grows an irrigated  crop  using water,  nitrogen,  and
other  inputs.  In order to focus on nitrogen application, nonnitrogen  inputs including land,
machinery,  and labor are assumed to be fixed.
Nitrogen is applied continuously via the irrigation system throughout the growing season.
However,  to  facilitate  the  analysis,  we  divide  the  growing  season  into  two periods  and
assume that nitrogen is applied only twice, one application in each period. A random event,
rainfall, occurs only during period one, affecting both soil moisture content and soil nitrogen
available to the crop. While some nitrogen is applied ex ante (before rainfall) at the beginning
of period one, that is, the beginning of the growing season, sidedressed nitrogen also can be
applied ex post after rainfall  is observed.
With the advanced irrigation  system (drip irrigation),  the farmer is able to maintain any
desired level  of soil moisture,  W*.  Obviously, the level  of W  is dependent on the cost of
irrigation. Since some irrigation is always done, irrigation set-up costs are irrelevant for our
analysis, and only variable costs (hereafter price per unit of water)  should be considered. In
order to focus on nitrogen use,  it is assumed that at the relevant range of water and nitrogen
prices, the optimal  level  of soil moisture  content  W  is such that water stress to plants is
eliminated  or  negligible.  Maintaining  soil  moisture  at  this  level  is  a  commonly  used
agricultural  practice  in many regions of Israel.  Obviously, the amount of irrigation  water
required  to  support  the  level  W* depends  on  the  rainfall.  Specifically,  the  amount  of
supplemental  irrigation water required  is W*- Z, where Z is the random quantity of rainfall
during the growing season. If the rainfall exceeds the threshold level  W*, no irrigation water
is applied.  Thus, the random cost of irrigation water is max [w( W  - Z),  0], where w is the
price per unit of irrigation water.
In  addition  to  soil  moisture  W,  the  amount of soil nitrogen  available  to  plants  is  an
important determinant of yield. Let A  be the initial  stock of plant-available  nitrogen in the
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soil at the beginning  of period one, which includes  nitrogen carryover  from the previous
period and can be observed by soil tests. Let Xand Ybe the nitrogen applied at the beginning
of period one and the quantity of nitrogen applied in period two (after rainfall), respectively.
Random rainfall can increase soil moisture over field capacity and cause leaching of nitrogen
below the root zone to the groundwater aquifer.  The total amount of nitrogen in the soil at
the beginning  of the season  is (A  + X).  Obviously, the more nitrogen carryover  from the
previous period, the less application X is required to maintain a given level of nitrogen in
the  soil at the  beginning of period one.  Nitrogen uptake by the plant at the beginning  of
period one (before rainfall) is (A +X)6, where 6 is the uptake rate, 0 < 6 < 1. The total amount
of plant available nitrogen subject to leaching is thus (A  + X)(1  - 6).
In period two,  after rainfall is observed,  some nitrogen can be applied as sidedressing.
Since it  is assumed that no rainfall occurs between the end of the current growing season
and the beginning  of the next (the  off-season period),  nitrogen applied  ex post,  Y, is  not
subject to  leaching.  This  assumption  applies  to  the  situation presented  in the  empirical
analysis  (wheat  grown  in  Israel).  However,  it  eliminates  interseasonal  dynamics  and,
therefore,  limits the generality of the analysis. The amount of nitrogen leached, L, depends
on the random rainfall and is equal to EZ( 1  - 6)(A +X), where 0 is the rate of nitrogen leached
beyond the root zone, 0 < 6 < 1. More simply,
(1)  L = PZ(A + X),
where  P = 0(1  - 6) > 0. For simplicity of exposition, the stock of nitrogen at the beginning
of period one, the term A  is  suppressed in the mathematical  analysis,  but it is explicitly
treated in the empirical application.
Yield is assumed to depend on the soil moisture W, the nitrogen applied at the beginning
of the growing  season (i.e.,  beginning  of period one), and the plant-available  nitrogen in
period two after the application of sidedressed nitrogen, N = (y - 3  Z)X+ Y, where y= 1 -
6. Note  that this expression describes  the  within-season  dynamics of nitrogen carryover.
Thus, yield can be represented by a production function q =f(X, N, W). Recall that the soil
moisture  is  maintained  at  the  threshold  level  W*.  Suppressing  W  as  an  argument,  the
production can be written
(2)  q = F(X,N)= F[X,(y  - Z)X+ Y].
The function F(Q) is assumed to be monotone increasing  and concave in both arguments, X
and N. Adequate quantities of X at the beginning of the season help the plant develop an
efficient root system and, as a result,  increase the efficiency of nitrogen uptake during the
growing season.  Thus, X and N may be complements  (FNX  > 0), substitutes  (FNX  < 0), or
independent  (FNx = 0).  In the empirical  analysis, FNx was  not found to  be  significantly
different from zero.
Production Decisions under First-Best Taxes
To control nitrogen leaching a policy maker may employ either taxes or quotas on nitrogen
application.  Since the  actual level of rainfall and the associated  nitrogen  leaching  can be
21t can be revived by placing Xby (A  +  X) henceforth.
124  July 1995Choi, Feinerman
observed, state-contingent taxes or quotas on nitrogen can be employed.  In this section we
investigate  production  decisions  under  first-best  tax  and  quota  and demonstrate  welfare
equivalence  of the  two policies.  We  assume  that  the policy  maker  observes the  ex ante
application X and  knows the values  of P  and  Z  _  EZ. With  a target  level  of expected
leaching  L  - EZX,  the policy maker can control ex ante application directly by imposing
a quota X = LPEZ, or indirectly by imposing a tax t on X.
Consider the production  decision  problem when a  first-best tax t is levied on  ex  ante
application but not on ex post application. To provide a common reference point to compare
production  decisions  under  a  quota  and  a  tax,  we  assume  that  the  producer  receives  a
lump-sum tax rebate, R, which does not distort production decisions. This rebate scheme is
consistent with the literature  that compares  taxes/tariffs and quotas on production/imports
(e.g., Weitzman;  Yohe  1976; Choi and Lapan; Choi and Johnson).
Ex Post Nitrogen Application
The farmer observes Z and then chooses  Y  in period two to maximize the profit:
(3)  7  = pF[X,(y  - Z)X+ Y] - s(Y+ X) - tX-  w(W  - Z)+  R,
where p is output price, s is per unit cost of nitrogen,  t is per unit nitrogen tax, w is the price
of irrigation water, and R is a lump-sum tax rebate.3 The first-order condition  is
(4)  pFN[X,(y  - PZ)X+ Y]-  s  = 0,
where a subscript denotes a partial derivative.  Observe that the level of nitrogen applied ex
ante, X, is fixed in period two. The ex post nitrogen demand, which solves (4), can be written
as  Y =  Y(s, p, X, Z). Differentiating  (4) with  respect to  the decision  variables  Y and  the
parameters  t, s, p, X, and Z gives
(5a)  ~ =0,
(5b)  Ys  I / pFNN < 0,
(5c)  Y  =-s  / p2 FNN > 0,
(5d)  Yx  -FN/  FNN-(Y  -PZ),  and
3Obviously,  some fraction of nitrogen  is carried over to the next period.  According to an accounting  method, such nitrogen
carryover is  an investment  in a sense, and an argument can  be made to  include its discounted  value in  the current  profit  t.
However,  in this case the value of nitrogen carryover from the previous growing season should also be deducted  from current
profit.  While  this method may  also be adequate,  it would complicate  the present  economic  analysis  unnecessarily  without
yielding additional insights.  To-simplify the economic analysis, nitrogen carryover from the previous growing season, A,  rather
than  the carryover to the next,  is included  in the profit function.  In a stationary situation,  such nitrogen  carryover is constant
across the years, and the two methods are identical, except  the discount factor.  It can  be shown  easily that under the specific
assumptions considered  here,  the level  of A is unchanged over  time.
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(5e)  Yz  =  X> 0.
In the derivation of (5a)-  (5c), Xwas treated as a predetermined  fixed parameter.  Since the
tax is imposed on ex ante fertilization only, it does not affect the ex post application directly
and hence, t is absent as an argument in Y(s, p, X, Z) and Y  = 0 in (5a).4 The ex post nitrogen
demand  Y(s, p, X, Z) is incorporated  into the ex ante application problems  in (6)  and (8)
presented below.  Differentiating N = (y  - PZ)X+ Y(s, p, X, Z) with respect to Z and using
(5e) yields
(5f)  dN/dZ=-PX+Y=  0,  and
(5g)  dN/dX=(y - Z) + Y  = -FN  FN.
Equation (5f)  implies that plant-available  nitrogen  in period two after rainfall is observed,
N, is  independent  of the random rainfall  Z. An economic  interpretation  for  this result is
straightforward.  Some portion of nitrogen applied early will be leached below the root zone
because  of rainfall.  After observing  the rainfall,  the farmer  adds  sidedressed  nitrogen to
insure  a constant level of plant-available  nitrogen N required to maximize profit ex post.
Because  of split nitrogen application,  farmers  can make  up the  loss of nitrogen through
leaching and hence retain input flexibility to respond to random weather.
Note from (5g) that the sign ofdNldXis identical to that of FNx. Assuming thatXdeclines
with Yyields sign {dNldt} = -sign {FNx}. In other words, the optimal level of  plant-available
nitrogen in period two decreases (increases) with tax if N and X are complements  (substi-
tutes). If, however, NandXare neutral or independent (FNX= 0), as is the case in the empirical
example  in the next section, the level of N is independent of t.
Ex Ante Nitrogen  Application
Sidedressing of nitrogen  is made in period two after the random rainfall Z is observed and,
hence, is not directly affected by risk attitudes. However, the application decision of nitrogen
applied ex ante, X, crucially  depends on risk preference of the producer.  We first consider
ex ante nitrogen application decisions under a tax scheme for a risk-neutral and a risk-averse
farmer, and compare them with those obtained under a nitrogen quota scheme.
Risk Neutrality. A risk-neutral  farmer's problem  at the beginning  of period one  is to
choose Xto maximize the expected profit:
(6)  E  nt'  = pEF[X,(^ - Z)X+ Y(s,  t, X,Z)] -s(EY  + X) - tX-  w(W* - EZ)+ R,
where E is the expectation operator. Recall that although Z is random, the farmer insures a
constant level  of plant-available  nitrogen in period two,  N  = (y-P  Z)X + Y(s, p,  X, Z).
4However,  t (as well as p and s) affects  Y indirectly through a change  in X. The total  effect of a tax change  is dYldt = Y +
Yx(dXldt).  Assuming that Xdeclines as the tax increases,  the indirect effect of t on Y  depends on the sign of Yx.  If, for example,
the inputs N and X are either substitutes or independent  (FNX < 0), Yx  is negative (5d), and hence,  Y  increases as t increases.  If
FNX > 0,  Y  may increase with X and decreases  with t. The indrect effect of t (as well as those of s and p) through a change  in
X depends on risk aversion. Specifically,  from equations  (7) and (10)  below,  it can be shown that dX/dt = - Ext l/E7sX  for a
risk-neutral  farmer,  whereas dXldt = -EUxt IEUx for a risk-averse  farmer.
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Moreover,  observe  that  since N is  independent  of Z, yield F(X, N) is not  random.  The
first-order condition is
En x - pEFx + pFNE(y - PZ + Yx)  - sE(Yx  + 1)-  t = 0.
Since N and F are independent of Z and pFN = s in (4), we get
(7)  En  = pFx[X, (y - PZ)X+ Y]-  s(6 + PEZ)-  t =  O.
Thus, the derived  demand for ex ante nitrogen  of a risk-neutral  farmer is written  as X
X(p, s, t, P, EZ). Note thatpFxis the value of marginal product ofX, and PEZ is the expected
leaching rate. In the absence of tax, the equilibrium condition is pFAl(6 + PEZ) = s = pFN.
Observe that pF/(6 +  P EZ) is the value of marginal product of X, adjusted for leaching,
and must be equal  to the value of marginal product of Y, which is not subject to leaching.
Thus, s(6 +  3  EZ) is the opportunity cost of nitrogen applied ex ante in the absence of tax.
RiskAversion. At the beginning of period one, a risk-averse farmer choosesXto maximize
the expected utility:
(8)  EU[rn
at]=EU{pF[X, (y - PZ)X+ Y]-s(Y+X)-tX-w(W*  -Z)+  R},
where  U(')  is  a  monotone  increasing  and  concave  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility
function,  U' (.) > 0,  U" ()  < 0. The first-order condition is
(9)  E[U' x] = EU'En x + cov(U',7  x)= 0,
where n x = pFx[X,  (y  - pZ)X + Y] - s(6 + PZ) - t. Note that since N is independent of Z,
dnr/dz = 7x  = -s  P < 0,  and dU' /dZ = U" z ,  where 7 z = w -pF N X= w-  spX. Thus,
the sign of nz depends on the per unit price of irrigation water w, nitrogen fertilizer s, and
the leaching rate P. In places where water is scarce (e.g., Israel), the price of irrigation water
is much higher  than nitrogen  fertilizer  and  iT z is positive,  that is,  an increase  in rainfall
increases profits.  We assume that n z >  0 because of scarcity of water.
Let Xat denote the optimal ex ante nitrogen application of a risk-averse farmer. Assuming
nz > 0 implies that cov(U',  inx)  > 0 in (9), and hence, Enx < 0 at Xat. Since Etx  = 0 at  X"t
in (7), and En7  is concave in Xby second-order condition,  a risk-averse  farmer uses more X
than a risk-neutral  farmer, that is, X"  > X1'.
Proposition 1: Assume  that a first-best tax is imposed on ex ante  application only and
that itz  >  0. Then a risk-averse farmer applies more nitrogen ex ante than a risk-neutral
farmer, that is, X'  > X'.
5Note that 7z>  0 implies an upper bound for the level of ex ante application, that is, X< w/svp  Based on the data used in the
empirical  example  presented  in  the next section,  the  value of this  upper bound is  186.9 kg/ha,  whereas  the highest  level of
optimal  ex ante application (for a risk-averse  farmer when  t = 0) is less than  130 kg/ha (see table  1).
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Action Equivalent First-Best Taxes under Risk-Neutrality and Risk-Aversion
Suppose the policy maker wishes to limit the expected nitrogen leaching below a target level
L.  Then the ex ante applicationXmust be limited toX = L /I EZ. The value oftax to achieve
the desired level of ex ante application, X, will depend on the risk attitude of the producer.
Let t" denote the tax rate which yields an ex ante application rate, X, for a risk-neutral farmer,
and let t"  be similarly defined for a risk-averse farmer. We now compare the action equivalent
tax rates for a risk-averse and a risk-neutral farmer. Differentiating (9) with respect to t gives
(10)  X /  t = -EUx, /EUx,
where EUxx < 0 by second-order condition, and
EUt = EU"n tn  + EU'c Xt,
(11)  7Ct  = pFX  Yt  - =-1 < 0,  and
n t =(pFN -s)Y  -X= -X< 0.
Since  t, is independent of Z,
(12a)  EU"rn x,  = n t[EU"n  ] = -X[EU"n x],  and
(12b)  EU'n  xt  = -EU' < O.
Assuming diminishing  absolute risk-aversion  (DARA),  it can be shown that EU"n X > 0.
Let Z  be the value ofZ for which  Tx = 0. Recall that Tcx  = -s  < 0, that is, 7tx is decreasing
in Z. Thus,
x <(>)0,  for Z>(<)Z*.
Moreover,  (n  ) is monotone increasing (an /  Z > 0).  Thus, given DARA,
R[n(Z)]<  R[7r(Z*)],  if  Z > Z.
Multiply both sides by U'[n  ]I  x,  which is negative for Z > Z .
(13)  -U"[n ]n x > R*  U'  x
For Z < Z,  R[x(Z)] > R  and  U'[r]7i  x > 0.  Hence,  the inequality  (13)  holds for Z ￿  Z.
Integrate  (13) over the entire range to get
-EU"r f < R  EU'7  = 0,
where  the  right  side  vanishes  by  the  first-order  condition  (9).  Thus,  given  DARA,
EU"r  c  > 0.  Therefore, EU"n xnt  in (12a) is negative.  Equations  (12a)  and (12b) imply
that EUxt in (11) is negative,  and hence,  aX/ At  in (10) is negative (given DARA). That is,
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an increase in tax reduces the level of ex ante  application X of a risk-averse farmer. This
result, together with that of Proposition  1, implies the following result:
Proposition  2: Assume that a first-best tax is imposed on ex ante application  only and
that farmers exhibit DARA. Then in order to attain a target level of X, a higher tax must
be imposed on a risk-averse farmer than on a risk-neutral farmer, that is, ta  > t".
It  should be noted that profits without rebates will depend on risk attitudes. We  show,
however, that profit after the tax is rebated is independent of risk attitudes. Noting that ta
and t" are action equivalent (they both yield the same levels of ex ante application, X)  and
substituting R = t"X* into (6), we obtain the profit of a risk-neutral  farmer:
(6')  nt  =pF[X*, (y - Z)X* + Y(s,  p, X,  Z)]-s(Y+ X*)- w(W* -Z).
Similarly, substituting R = taX  into (6) for a risk-averse  farmer, the random profits of the
risk-neutral and the risk-averse producers are the same for each value of Z, as in (6'), that
is,  sat  = n 
t. In other words, with tax rebate, profit is independent of risk attitude under the
first-best tax scheme.
First-Best Quotas
For  an  expected  leaching  target  L,  the  policy  maker  can  directly  control  the  ex  ante
application by imposing a quota X  = L /P EZ. In this case, there is no ex ante optimization
problem. In period two after Z is observed, the producer chooses  Yto maximize the profit:
(14)  n x= pF[X*,  (  - PZ)X* + Y] - s(Y+ X*)  - w(W*  - Z).
Consider an ex ante quota X* and a tax t n on ex ante application that are action equivalent
for a risk-neutral  farmer, that is, Xnt = X. Then the ex post problem with an ex ante quota
X*  is exactly the same as that under the equivalent ex ante tax t". Since no tax is imposed on
ex post nitrogen  application,  the ex post application  problem with an ex ante quota X* is
exactly the same  as that under the action equivalent tax t  which yields Xnt = X. Thus, the
ex ante nitrogen tax tn and the ex ante nitrogen quota X  = Xnt yield the same profit after
rebate  at all  states, that  is,  e n t = I
X for the risk-neutral  farmer,  and  hence,  Ein t = ETx .
Moreover,  for a given ex ante quota X*, the ex post application  Y is determined  after Z is
realized.  Thus, the ex post application  Y and profit are  independent of risk attitudes,  and
hence  Tx  in (13) is the same for risk-neutral and risk-averse  farmers.
Assume  that X* and  ta are  action  equivalent  for a  risk-averse  farmer.  Then the  same
argument can be used to show that Xat = X*, and hence, the ex post application problem is
the same, regardless of risk attitudes, that is, I"at = T1 X for the risk-averse farmer. Thus, EU[nat]
= EU[T].
Proposition 3: Let tn and X  be  a first-best tax  and  a  first-best quota  that are  action
equivalent on ex ante application  for a risk-neutral  farmer, and let  ta and X*  be action
equivalent  for a risk-averse  farmer. Then the first-best tax and the first-best quota are
also welfare equivalent, whether producers are risk-neutral or risk-averse,  that is, 
nt =
a  7,  and En  = E,  and EU[t  =  EUX T  =TQ,  andE  = EiT,  and EU  =]EU[t]c.
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An Example: Wheat in Israel
To  estimate  the  production  function  F  in  (2)  and  the  nitrogen uptake  rate,  5,  we  used
experimental data for an irrigated wheat (cultivar "Miriam  1") from Kafkafi and Bar Yosef.
The wheat was seeded  in the middle of November  1969 and harvested in mid-May  1970.
The rainy season relevant for our analysis is from the end of November to the end of March.
The end of March was chosen as  the end of period one and the beginning of period two.
Using data on plant-available  nitrogen in the root zone (0-40 cm), A  + X, at the beginning
of December ("beginning" of period one) and at the beginning of April (period two), we first
estimated the production function by using ordinary least squares (OLS) for three polynomial
functions:  the quadratic,  the square root, and the three halves. The polynomial forms were
previously recommended and chosen by Hexem and Heady to represent response to nitrogen
and water for a  few selected crops.  The quadratic specification  performed best among the
polynomials  examined  for yield  with  15  observations  and  10  degrees  of freedom.  The
estimated yield-response function  (with t-values  in parentheses)  is
F = -4342.61+  53.659(A  + X)  - 0.1210(A  + X) 2 + 71.157N  - 0.3255N2,
(3.666)  (-3.056)  (2.471)  (-2.188)
R2 = 0.7912,
where  the  units  of F, A, X,  and N are  in kilograms  per hectare  (kg/ha).  Unfortunately,
biological  theory  does  not provide much guidance  in determining  appropriate  functional
form and the quadratic  function  is selected on statistical grounds (highest R  and t-statistic
values).  Obviously,  it may result  in a positive yield even when no nitrogen  is available at
the early growth stage. However,  in practice, A and Xare both positive and hence this case
is unlikely and may be ignored.  It should be emphasized that the cross product term, (A  +
X)N, was initially included in the regression equation, but the estimated value of  its parameter
was close to zero and was statistically insignificant (t < 0.1).  In other words, in the specific
example considered, (A  + X) and N are roughly independent inputs (FNx  0).
The value of nitrogen uptake,  6,  chosen  for our illustrative example was 0.6, which  is
approximately a simple average of nitrogen uptake of the experimental plots. Unfortunately,
the experimental  results of Kafkafi and Bar-Yosef do not  include  information on nitrogen
leaching below the root zone. Following a personal communication with Kafkafi, the value
of the leaching parameter was assumed to be 0.0012, which implies  3=  0(1 - 6) = 0.0005.
Additional parameter  values chosen  for the example  were p = $0.18 per kg of grain yield
(which represents the market price net of nonnitrogen and nonwater variable costs per kg of
wheat); s = $1.07 per kg of pure inorganic  nitrogen fertilizer;  w = $0.10 per cubic meter of
irrigation water; W  = 650 mm, and E(Z) = 528.75 mm, which is a simple average of 41 years
of rainfall  data  (1950/51-1990/91)  in  the  experimental  area.  The  assumed value  of the
pre-planting plant-available nitrogen in the soil, A,  was  100 kg/ha.
The ex ante and ex post optimization problems for various values of t were solved for a
risk-neutral  farmer  and  a  risk-averse  farmer.6 A constant  relative  risk-aversion  (CRRA)
utility function,  U = -7  -R,  was used for the example where  R is the relative risk-aversion
measure. To illustrate the impact of risk aversion, the chosen value of R was  123 so that a
6Observe that undera first-best quotaX* there is no ex ante optimization  problem. Moreover, the ex post optimization problem
under an ex ante quota X*  is exactly the same as that under an action equivalent tax,  as shown in the section on the first-best
quotas. Thus, the empirical results for the quota problem are ommited here.
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Table 1.  Empirical Findings for a Risk-Neutral Farmer
Plant-
Early  Available  Wheat  Expected
Nitrogen  Nitrogen  Grain  Nitrogen  Expected Profits/ha
Tax  Application  in Period Two  Yield  Leaching  Ee  nt
t  X"  N  q  L  Before  After
($/kg)  (kg/ha)  (kg/ha)  (kg/ha)  (kg/ha)  Rebate  Rebate
0.00  100.46  100.16  5412.41  53.10  648.05  648.05
0.05  99.32  5406.35  52.79  643.05  648.02
0.10  98.17  5399.98  52.49  638.11  647.93
0.15  97.02  5393.28  52.19  633.24  647.79
0.20  95.87  5386.26  51.88  628.42  647.59
0.23  95.18  5381.90  51.70  625.55  647.44
0.25  94.73  5378.93  51.58  623.65  647.33
0.30  93.57  5371.27  51.27  618.94  647.01
0.35  92.43  5363.30  50.97  614.29  646.64
0.40  91.28  5355.00  50.67  609.70  646.21
0.50  88.99  5337.47  50.06  600.69  645.18
0.60  86.69  5318.65  49.45  591.91  643.92
0.65  85.54  5308.77  49.15  587.60  643.20
0.70  84.40  5298.56  48.84  583.34  642.42
0.80  82.10  5277.20  48.23  575.02  640.70
1.00  77.51  5230.64  47.02  559.06  636.57
risk-averse farmer applies about 30% more nitrogen ex ante than a risk-neutral farmer when
no tax or quota is imposed. The results for the first-best tax for a risk-neutral and a risk-averse
farmer  are summarized in tables  1 and 2, respectively.
Several points in the example are worth noting:
1. The value of plant-available  nitrogen in period two, N = 100. 16 kg/ha is the same for the
risk-neutral  and  risk-averse  farmers.  From  (5g),  dNldX is  positive,  zero,  or negative
according to whether FNx is positive, zero, or negative. For example, if  FN  were positive,
Xa( > X' t implies N"'  >  i
t . In our example, FNX = 0, and hence dN/dX = 0, and thus the
plant-available nitrogen in period two is independent of risk attitude. Moreover,  FNX = 0
implies that the optimal level of N is independent of the tax rate.
2.  Observe that since nT = 0.10 - 1.07 x 0.0005X is positive for all levels ofXin the relevant
range, X" t is greater than X"' for  all levels of t, as predicted  by Proposition  1. This is
particularly  true for low values oft. For example, X "t is greater than X"t by 29%  when t
= 0, and only by about 3.5% when t = 0.5. Obviously, both X "t and X"' decrease when t
increases.  Specifically,  X " l  decreases  linearly  with t at  a low  rate  for all  levels of t;
whereas Xa' decreases at a high rate for low values of t and at a low rate for high values
of t (e.g., X"' decreases by 31.45% when t increases  from 0 to $0.25 and only by 8.5%
when t increases  from $0.70 to $1).
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Table 2.  Empirical Findings for a Risk-Averse  Farmer
Plant-
Early  Available  Wheat  Expected
Nitrogen  Nitrogen  Grain  Nitrogen  Expected  Profits/ha
Tax  Application  in Period Two  Yield  Leaching  E_"'
t  X' N  q  L  Before  After
($/kg)  (kg/ha)  (kg/ha)  (kg/ha)  (kg/ha)  Rebate  Rebate
0.00  129.68  100.16  5459.32  60.84  629.45  629.45
0.05  123.56  5466.60  59.22  630.25  636.43
0.10  115.93  5462.98  57.19  631.25  642.84
0.15  112.92  5457.68  56.40  627.73  644.67
0.20  103.48  5426.82  53.90  627.15  647.85
0.23  100.94  5414.84  53.22  624.76  647.98
0.25  98.65  5402.69  52.62  622.42  647.08
0.30  97.98  5398.90  52.44  618.51  647.91
0.35  96.11  5387.24  51.95  613.99  647.63
0.40  94.44"  5377.05  51.50  609.48  647.26
0.50  92.09  5360.88  50.88  600.48  646.52
0.60  89.69  5342.98  50.24  591.71  645.52
0.65  88.53  5333.82  49.94  587.41  644.95
0.70  87.38  5324.43  49.63  583.15  644.32
0.80  85.08  5305.45  49.02  574.83  642.89
1.00  80.49  5261.45  47.81  558.86  639.35
3.  Expected nitrogen leaching,  L  = PE(Z)X, for the risk-neutral  farmer decreases  linearly
with t at a very low rate;  whereas, for the risk-averse  farmer it declines  fast at low rates
of t and becomes  relatively  insensitive to tax for values of t above $0.25. Note further
that when t increases  from zero to $1.00,  L  decreases by 27%  (from 60.84 to 47.81 kg
of nitrogen) for the risk-averse farmer and only by 13%  (from 53.10 to 47.02 kg) for the
risk-neutral farmer.
4.  For the sake of illustration,  assume first that the leaching target set by the policy maker
is equal to L  for the risk-neutral farmer when no tax is imposed, that is, L  = 53.10 kg/ha
of available nitrogen (table  1). The tax level that yields the same target for the risk-averse
farmer t" is about $0.23/kg (table 2). These results demonstrate Proposition 2 that to attain
a target level of expected leaching (or a target level of  X), a higher tax must be imposed
on a risk-averse farmer than on a risk-neutral farmer (t"  > t"). Moreover, note from table
1 that Et"'(t  = 0) = EJ at(ta  $0.23)  ~ $648/ha after rebate as stated in Proposition  3.
If the target leaching level reduces to 50 kg/ha, or the target ex ante application  is X =
89.13  kg/ha (or A  + X  =  189.13),  then the taxes that  should be imposed to attain this
target level are about t" = $0.50/kg  for the risk-neutral farmer and t" = $0.65/kg for the
risk-averse  farmer, respectively.  Again, t"  > t" and Enflt((  $0.50) = Elat(tn  $0.65)
$645/ha after the rebate.
5.  Obviously, the expected profit before rebate for the risk-neutral farmer is higher than for
the  risk-averse  farmer,  especially  under  the  lower  tax  levels.  For  t > $0.15/kg,  the
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differences between the expected profits before rebate for a risk-neutral and a risk-averse
farmers  are negligible. But when t <  $0.15, the expected profit after rebate  is higher for
the risk-neutral  farmer under the low tax level.  It is interesting  to note that while the
after-rebate  expected  profit  for the risk-neutral  farmer  decreases  monotonically  as  t
increases, this is not true for the risk-averse farmer. When t increases from zero to $0.23,
En'  after rebate increases and then remains  stable for a wide range of t values.
Concluding Remarks
This article investigates the effects of first-best policies to regulate nitrogen use at the farm
level. Yield is assumed to depend on the plant-available nitrogen at the beginning and after
the rainy season.  Due to random rainfall,  some portion of nitrogen applied at the beginning
of the  season  leaches  below  the  root  zone  and  contaminates  the  groundwater  aquifer.
Leaching of sidedressed nitrogen applied after the rainy season is assumed to be negligible.
"First-best"  policy is a tax or a quota imposed on ex ante  application because  ex post
application is not subject to leaching. It is shown that a risk-averse farmer uses more nitrogen
ex ante than a risk-neutral  one to attain a target level of expected leaching, and therefore, a
higher tax must be imposed on the former than on the latter (t a >  t"). A first-best tax and a
quota that are action equivalent will yield the same level of welfare,  whether the farmer is
risk-neutral or averse.
An empirical  model for wheat in Israel was used to illustrate the analytical  findings. It
is shown that the gap between Xat and X nt is higher for low tax values and that the impact
of a tax increase  from the no-tax  situation on the reduction in expected leaching is greater
for the risk-averse farmer than  for the risk-neutral  one. The expected profit after rebate is
higher for the risk-neutral farmer under low tax levels (t < $0.15/kg) and slightly lower when
t exceeds $0.15. The numerical example also shows that under certain conditions, expected
profit (not utility) of a risk-averse  farmer may  be higher  with taxes than without  them,
provided that taxes are rebated.
Although first-best taxes and quotas  are efficient  measures to achieve  a target level  of
leaching, it may be difficult to enforce them in practice. First-best quotas or taxes are applied
on ex ante nitrogen application and not on ex post application, because leaching of nitrogen
applied ex post is negligible. If the storage cost of nitrogen is not prohibitively high, farmers
may purchase and store nitrogen at the end of a season and use it at the beginning of the next
season, thereby  effectively  evading  nitrogen tax or quota.  This possibility of tax or quota
evasion points to the need for studying second-best policies to regulate nitrogen use.
If the split between ex ante and ex post applications  is not easily observed by the policy
maker, total nitrogen use may be monitored by controlling the supply of nitrogen. When the
storage cost is not prohibitively high, it may be practical to control total nitrogen use, which
is a second-best  policy.  Analysis of second-best  policies  can be  found  in Feinerman  and
Choi.  Many public utilities  (e.g.,  electricity)  can monitor the timing of consumption  and
charge  different rates accordingly.  Thus, if the government  can monitor early nitrogen use
or if the  storage  cost is  high, then  first-best policy is not only  feasible but may also be
practical.
[Received September 1993; final version received October 1995.]
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